"Thucydides Trap"

America’s erratic actions and constant policy shifts make a lot more sense when viewed from the lens of what Noah Millman calls the “Thucydides trap”.

“(It refers to) a situation where a rising power and an established power facing a possible power transition each make moves that, while individually rational, ultimately lead to a catastrophic war that proves ruinous to both powers’ fortunes.”

 

With Obama, America tried a “pivot to Asia” approach to counter China, i.e., increase the focus on China and its neighbouring countries, reduce the focus elsewhere (The pivot to Asia is why the US didn’t do much/anything when Russia invaded Crimea in 2016; why Obama signed the nuclear deal with Iran). Obama was being pragmatic – it was clear that the assumption that the only road to economic prosperity went hand in hand with democracy and other Western systems was not true. China was prospering without democracy; and showing signs of not wanting to be part of a system dominated by the West.

 

Would Obama’s approach have worked? We will never know because along came Trump (first time). He tore up the Iran deal; announced the US wasn’t interested in acting as the global cop; and started a trade war with China. We will never know if Trump’s approach would have worked since COVID-19 messed up everything and everybody, and geopolitics took a backseat as countries scrambled to deal with the pandemic and its economic costs.

 

Then came Biden and he declared war on China (for all practical purposes). He started the chip war by limiting the chips available to China. He deepened the commitment to Taiwan and placed emphasis on the Quad (US, Australia, Japan and India) to counter China militarily. This was all out war (minus the shooting) as far as China was concerned, and they started taking countermeasures. Biden had taken the two countries into total confrontation mode, the effects of which only got more and more pronounced with time.

 

Unlike the Cold War though, this time the situation was different. China, unlike the USSR, is an economic powerhouse. All countries need goods (and key raw materials) from China. Thus, most countries (including traditional allies like Germany) didn’t want to pick a side in the US v/s China confrontation; and their reluctance has made America’s policy that much harder to implement. Secondly, China is not a technology weakling like the USSR, and they are developing more and more tech in-house, include chips. Third, China is a huge market unlike the USSR. So a lot of companies all over the world, including the US and its allies, fight and campaign against boycotting China. Biden tried to re-use the US Cold War tactics and ignored fundamental differences between the USSR and China.

“The Biden administration strategy—for all its logic—amounted to steering the ship of state right into the Thucydides Trap, and hoping to emerge victorious.”

 

Thucydides Trap or not, would Biden’s approach have worked? Again, we will never know since Trump came back and changed policy again. The bigger question, says Millman, is for America to ask itself whether it can stay on as the global top dog. Or if it needs to start adjusting to a duopoly with China, and an increasing number of countries that won’t fall cleanly into either of those 2 sides – Russia, India, Brazil, Iran and others. All of them will dance with everyone else based on what works for them, making the world complicated and multipolar. On the economic side of the revised world, take a country like Vietnam. It fears China militarily and wants American military support and at the same time, welcomes China’s investments. Thus, even as the US tries to “contain” Chinese goods exports, such attempts are easily circumvented by Chinese investments and companies registered in places like Vietnam.

 

All of which is why Millman feels the faster the US acknowledges the emerging reality (America and China as the top 2 players; a reduction in American power and influence; a rise of other lesser powers who don’t fully align with either China or America), the faster they can frame realistic policies. Until they do that, they will just be flailing wildly with major policy changes every few years. Denial cannot not be a strategy.