Withdrawal Symptoms

Extended deterrence. It refers to America’s promises to use its firepower, including nukes, to protect (some of) its allies. It emerged after World War II, with Europe destroyed and needing to rebuild, not spend on arming itself against the USSR. It extended to Japan since the Americans didn’t want Japan to arm itself and risk another war down the road. It covered South Korea since Korea had become a symbolic line in the sand against communist expansion in Asia.

 

In this interview/chat, one of the participants said:

“We never implemented extended deterrence out of altruism or charity… This allowed us to keep the economies and political systems of our allies free, democratic, and capitalist, which created open markets for the US.”

 

Another benefit (from the US perspective, that is) of such extended deterrence was that fewer countries pursued nuclear weapons. Of the 34 or so US allies, only France pursued nukes. Why? Because they feared (rightly, as events have proven decades later) that someday American policy might change, that they may withdraw the security umbrella. But France and Britain (the interview doesn’t mention why Britain got nukes) aside, none of the other allies pursued nukes.

 

But merely having nukes and promising to use them in the event of Soviet (or Chinese) invasion is one thing. Many Europeans were wary whether the US would ever really commit to the so-called Berlin-for-Boston trade – if Berlin was attacked, would America really go to war and risk an expansion of the scope of the war to include Boston as a target?

 

This needed a lot of trust, a belief in the receiver that such protection wasn’t limited to who happened to be the US President at the time. Germany in fact went one step further – they insisted American troops be posted in Germany so the US had skin in the game, troops on German soil who might die.

 

The interview panel called this the “hardware” and “software” elements. By hardware, they mean the possession and ability to deliver American protection. By software, they mean the trust, the faith that America would actually act if the situation arose.

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Today, Trump is open in saying that he doesn’t see why the US needs to get dragged into wars everywhere, and equally why the US should spend on protecting others (and how much should be the contribution of the protectee).

 

This is opening up a Pandora’s box in America’s allies. All the trust (“software) in America’s protection is now under question in more and more of those countries. South Korea. Europe in general. Poland in particular. Milder signs in Japan.

 

Most of them have no hope of resisting and winning in a conventional war against their likely aggressor – Russia for Europe, China for Japan and Taiwan, North Korea for South Korea. Which means more and more of these countries are starting to consider getting nukes as the only real safeguard.

 

But getting nukes isn’t easy. There are treaties (the infamous NPT that India resisted for decades) to withdraw from. Build centrifuges and other expertise. Run the risk of sanctions and threats from existing powers if they pursue this path. Or even worse, run the risk that enemies will conduct pre-emptive strikes before they get the nukes (like Israel has done in the Middle East).

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Then there is China. Historically, it had around 200 nukes. Of late, it has been increasing the count by about 100 a year. Their target is to have the same as the US and Russia (around 1,500 each).

 

For the US, this is a huge problem. With both Russia and China now considered enemies, they need to have more nukes than both. Otherwise, the US runs the risk that they get locked down in a conflict with one (Russia or China) and have nothing left to threaten the other with!

 

Alternately, if it breaches 1,000 nukes, China may conclude that the US will not dare intervene in Taiwan.

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The chat doesn’t go beyond the above, but I don’t think things will not stop there. If China’s count increases beyond a point, India will feel obliged to increase its count. Which will force Pakistan to do the same.

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To wind up, this is the conundrum. American withdrawal is a good thing in many ways, given their history of interventions and wars across the globe. But the effect of their withdrawal is all of the above. Net, net, it is impossible to say whether things would have gotten worse or better if America goes through with the Trump approach of withdrawal and lesser involvement.