Middle East #2: Between the World Wars
With World War I over, and the end of the Ottoman empire, all promises began to get broken. All the actors (Britain, France, Arabs, and Jews) felt betrayed and angry with everyone else, writes James Barr in A Line in the Sand.
And yet, each
group had to work with whichever set happened to align with their interests at
that moment. Britain needed Palestine under its control for two reasons:
(1) It was strategically located wrt the Suez, Britain’s must-have route to its
Asian colonies; and (2) It needed a port for the export of Iraqi oil to
Britain. In this regard, they were OK with either British or Jewish control of
Palestine. But of course, that was unacceptable to the Arabs. Whose fury was
stoked by the French.
France, on the
other hand, wanted Syria and (modern day) Lebanon under its control for
historical reasons as well as a safe route for the Iraqi oil flow to France.
The Arabs obviously were not OK with such a setup. A sentiment (and consequent
rebellions) the British were quite happy to support.
But even as they
mistrusted each other and fuelled trouble in the others’ “territories”, both
Britain and France knew that too much Arab success was dangerous. It would
inevitably spread the demand for independent Arab lands across both British and
French controlled areas. Additionally, if either Britain or France was forced
to withdraw from some regions, the other party would have to move in.
Why? To prevent Arab self-rule in the vacated area from becoming the catalyst
for independence in other regions. You can see how dangerous things were – it
was like the Goldilocks problem of trying to keep the other side unstable, but
not pushing too far to cause them to lose altogether.
Yet, brute force
wasn’t enough to maintain control over their respective areas. Hence both
Britain and France tried to enlist some regional leaders to their side. But of
course, in typical colonialist fashion, they wanted that leader to be someone
they could “control”. The easiest way for that was to ensure the man they
picked was someone not exactly from that region but from some neighbouring
region, or as in Iraq’s case, someone from the minority religion (Sunni instead
of Shia). All such choices would add to internal strife within the respective
regions, amongst the Arabs themselves.
Things were even
more complicated. An additional reason Britain wanted Arab oil was that it
served as a counterweight against their dependence on American oil. That
resulted in the US having too much control over Britain. The US, on the other
hand, as the largest oil producer at the time, didn’t want an over-supply of
Arab oil to bring down prices that would affect American companies. And so the
US inserted itself into the area, not militarily, but by muscling in a stake in
the oil company operating in the region, the Turkish Petroleum Company. That
way, they could regulate (to some extent) the extraction amount, the rate of
flow, and the route the oil would take to Europe (via French controlled regions
or British controlled regions).
As the Nazis began
to rise, Hitler’s anti-Semitism drove Jews even more numbers to Palestine. This
added fuel to the fire. The Arabs were furious with the changing demographic.
When Arab revolts began to grow, Britain was quite happy to enlist the Jews to
put the revolts down. Jewish excesses in turn would drive Arab hatred towards
Jews to even greater heights.
Finally, as
Hitler’s belligerence made another European war look increasingly inevitable,
Britain realized it would need to move more troops home, and away from the
Middle East. So they had to hand Arabs greater control over the region.
Palestine was now a thorn – the Arabs insisted it too should come under their
control. And so a cynical Britain decided to side with the Arabs. Sure, the
Jews would feel betrayed, but hey, with Hitler’s increased anti-Semitism, what
choice would the Jews have but to stick with the British in Europe?
This then was the configuration of the Middle East on the cusp of World War II.
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