Post-Galwan

What’s the outcome of the Galwan standoff? In the immediate now, China has obviously come out on top. But the longer-term outcome is far more murky.

The banning of Chinese apps, taken at face value, hardly meant anything, beyond hitting the profits of Tik Tok. But has it set India thinking more concretely along certain new lines, wonders the Deccan Herald:

“It has also signalled that it is willing to bear economic costs with its decisions to keep Chinese companies out of government contracts, infrastructure and critical strategic sectors.”

A significantly lower share of the largest growing economy in the world (other than China itself) will hurt China. Or are the Chinese hoping that the cost advantage of Chinese companies can’t be wished away? Or will India, if more such incidents happen, take that plunge anyway? Can China be sure of what India may or may not do on the economic front?

On a bigger scale, did China push once too often in its territorial disputes? Consider the fact that the usual suspect aside (US), even Japan and Australia spoke up. Nobody is claiming that all these countries are pro-India; but it certainly seems like they are becoming more and more China-phobic:

“From the West to the East, a new consensus seems to be evolving that China’s challenge to the basic norms of the extant global order cannot go unchallenged as the costs of inaction might be too high in the future. The global landscape, which till a few months back looked remarkably benign for China, has now turned against the Middle Kingdom in a manner that Chinese policymakers can ill-afford to ignore.”

As an example, will the proposed alliance called the “Quad” (Australia, Japan, India and US) get an impetus to get started to contain China? And if any anti-China alliance gets traction, would the smaller South East Asian countries jump onboard too? Would China be willing to take that risk?

Then again, was Galwan not a case of China (just) pushing and bullying its way, but a response to what they felt India was doing, asks KC Singh?

“China already had concerns about India upgrading its connectivity to vital outposts on LAC, particularly a major new road, running at places close to the LAC, leading to the airstrip at Daulat Beg Oldie. This new artery would facilitate a safe and rapid supply line all the way up to the Karakoram Pass. River valleys like Galwan provide two-way access.”

Are all the territorial disputes that China gets into (India, Japan, South China Sea, hell even Bhutan!) the usual behavior of a rising power that history has seen time and time again?

We can’t know the answer to any of these questions with certainty. Neither can China.