MU-7: Brains in Vats

(This blog will not appear to have any connection to maths and make you wonder about the title. So let me clarify at the start: it’s meant as a build-up to the next blog that will make the connection clear).

Have you heard of the “brain in a vat” thought experiment? Here’s how it goes: imagine that you are not who/what you think you are; instead you are just a brain hooked up into electrodes that can perfectly simulate the experiences of what you think is the outside world.

The kicker with this thought experiment? You can neither prove nor disprove that it is true! And since you can’t disprove it, it follows that it is entirely possible that nothing about your perception of “reality” is true either! I don’t know if this is in any way similar to the Hindu concept of maya…but it does sound similar to some extent.

I am in that camp which feels that just because something cannot be disproven doesn’t make it true. Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t. And practically speaking, I wonder, does it even matter whether we are brains in vats or the “real” thing? Either way, wouldn’t our perception of the world be the same (we would observe cause and effect, experience pleasure and pain, happiness and sadness in both cases)? So why spend time on such an unanswerable question that in any case doesn’t make any difference to anything?

And then I read John Barrow’s book, The Infinite Book, and realized that it may matter after all. He points out that David Hume analyzed the impact of us living in a simulation on the idea of God:

“Many worlds (simulations) might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, when this system was struck out…This world, for aught he knows, is faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard, and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance; it is the work of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors…”

Then there’s the impact on how we should live if we know we are in a simulation. Barrow describes Robert Hanson’s point very humorously:

“After all, Hanson suggests, if you are part of somebody’s simulation, be entertaining! Be famous! Be a pivotal person! This will increase the chances of your simulated experience continuing, and others will want to resimulate you in the future. Fail to have these characteristics and you could become like the soap-opera character who quickly gets written out of the show, taking a long holiday in Vladivostok, never to return.”

I guess philosophies can lead to any conclusions you would like them to “prove”.