Pax Romana #3: Expansion and Rebellions

Once the Roman Republic was replaced with emperors, wouldn’t the ego and greed of emperors have triggered more wars for expansion? Adrian Goldsworthy analyses just that question in Pax Romana.

 

Ironically (at first sight), once the era of the emperor started, Rome became less aggressive in its expansion plans. The reason is interesting. The emperor, of course, had to stay in Rome. Whom should he entrust with the role of the military commander leading any expansion efforts into faraway lands?

“(The emperor) risked giving that man fame and glory, perhaps even allowing him to subvert the loyalty of the soldiers under his command.”

This concern is exemplified by this instance where a general advanced deep into Germany. He was quickly recalled by the emperor, leading to his lament:

“How lucky Roman generals were in the old days.”

 

For this very reason, few emperors trusted family or senators to “hold too many major commands”. Provincial bosses were not allowed to control more than four, later reduced to three, legions.

“(This limit was to ensure that they) did not on their own have enough military force to overthrow the emperor.”

What if several of them joined hands? Surely then they’d have the numbers. But:

“The competitive instincts of Roman aristocrats made this unlikely in most circumstances.”

 

The reluctance of going to war (at least, not to expand the empire, but yes, definitely to retain the empire) thus had the side effect of keeping the peace, aka Pax Romana.

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The other question many have is: How come people under occupation didn’t rebel against the Romans? How could peace be maintained in such a situation?

 

Goldsworthy points out that rebellions did occur. But most rebels did not have the arms or the training to defeat the Roman army and so they were usually short lived and did not impact long term peace in the occupied lands.

 

Earlier, we saw, Roman emperors did not want the provinces to have too large an army, for fear of overthrowing the emperor. Surely the below-size army could have been defeated by the rebels? True, and the Roman strategy to address this problem was to have the army hit back quickly at the first signs of rebellion. The advantage to hitting back early was that it might crush the rebellion before it gathered too much steam and supporters. The risk was that the army could be outnumbered and caught without supply lines. More often than not, the sheer confidence and reputation of the Roman army carried them through.

 

Another key reason Goldsworthy attributes to why rebellions were not frequent, or long lived, or successful is the same one that explains later day colonies: how could tiny Britain colonize much larger countries? The mistake (in both cases) is to apply modern national identities and boundaries to earlier times.

“The provinces were artificial creations of the conquering power with little to unify their inhabitants… (Therefore) it is unlikely that the entire population of a province ever rebelled… A charismatic leader and shared resentment might unite them for a while, but strain was always likely.”

Besides, the resentment was often limited against local leaders “rather than the empire as a whole”.

 

Interesting reasons why peace and yes, dominance could be maintained for so long by Rome.